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Political instability has arguably been the most important factor that defined the African political 
landscape for the past five post-independence decades. Few countries in the region were immune from 
the costly conflicts that afflicted the region. It is perhaps no surprise then that a growing volume of 
literature on African political economy chose to explain the lacklustre economic performance of the 
countries in terms of absence of political stability. However, studies generally tend to downplay the 
diversities in the political economy trajectories of the different countries in the region. By highlighting 
one such cross-country variation, this study analyses the determinants of regime survival in Africa. 
More specifically, we apply survival analysis techniques to identify the institutional features behind 
observed differences in regime survival. We find that colonial legacy as well as level of income is 
important determinants of the hazard rates for regime survival in Africa.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
One finds ample evidence that indicates the relatively 
high frequency and longevity of political conflicts in Africa 
since the early 1960s (Easterly and Levine, 1997, 
Guillaumont et al., 1999). The extensive data set com-
piled by the African Research Program at Harvard 
University provides a useful quantitative account of the 
extent of political instability in Africa. Accordingly, of the 
1196 years covered by the data, the number of years in 
which countries in the region did go through at least one 
unrest was about 546. Similarly, in about 11% of the 
cases, there were extra-constitutional attempts to over-
throw governments in office. The countries in the region 
also experienced full scale wars every fifteen years. 
Nevertheless, given that 46 countries were covered in the 
study, such un-weighted mean values are likely to 
camouflage otherwise sizeable within region variations in 
terms of political instability. At one extreme there existed 
countries that had long historical record of political 
violence, which included such countries as Angola, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique and Sudan, while a few others 
including Botswana, Gabon and Tanzania remained 
relatively stable. It is in particular this diverse experience 
in political instability that represents the theme of the 
paper. With the help of one indicator of political stability, 
i.e. regime tenure, we investigate the factors that explain 
cross-country differences in the survival of governments 
in Africa. The paper is organised as follows. In section II, 
we present a selective review of the literature on political 
instability with particular reference to Africa. We then 
discuss the model and variable measurement issues in 
section III. Findings will be discussed in section IV while 
the last section concludes. 
 
 
Why do political instabilities occur? 
 
A search for the causal factors of political instabilities has 
long attracted scholarly interest that crosscuts different 
disciplines, albeit mostly as part of a wider research 
question. Africa has been largely portrayed for its insta-
bility that some scholars have even gone great length to 
‘deAfricanise’ success stories, as is done by Acemoglu et 
al. (2003) regarding Botswana. Others included African 
data in a broader context. A case in point is provided by 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) who empirically tested on a 
sample of 71 countries the effects of income inequality on 
economic growth as well as Gyimah-Brempong and 
Taynor, 1999). They hypothesised that income inequality 
adversely affects economic growth through its positive 
association with socio-political instability. By applying a 
principal components method on a five-dimension social 
unrest variable, the study found that income inequality 
increases socio-political instability which in turn reduces 
investment. Such findings were further endorsed by 
Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (2002) who draw several 
inferences on the links  between  economic  performance 
  
 
 
and political instability in Africa. Nkurunziza and Bates 
(2003) also assess the impacts of stability, regime type 
and violence on economic growth in Africa. A string of 
variables that capture different dimensions of political 
upheavals, such as constitutional crisis, political 
assassinations, revolutions and riots, were used to derive 
a single weighted index of political instability. Azam 
(1995) discusses the choices an African government 
faces as to whether to bolster its defence or redistribute 
to opponents using a game-theoretic model. Despite a 
long-standing tradition to link Africa’s rather dismal 
performance in politics and economics to its ethnic make-
up (e.g. Easterly and Levine 1997), Kasara (2007) 
provides empirical evidence against such a paradigm 
(See also Bardhan (1997) on the complexities of the 
ethnic issue and Mkandawire (2001) on the compatibility 
of development and state character in Africa. In several 
studies, political instability need not necessarily be 
preceded by overthrow of governments. Other studies, 
however, define political instability as an event which was 
accompanied by changes in government (Deaton and 
Miller 1995; Knack and Keefer 1995).  The voluminous 
research on the effects of regime types on economic 
growth, though not necessarily with only an African focus, 
include Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Savvides (1995), 
and Tsangarides (2001) while Acemoglu (2003) deal with 
the effects of colonial history on institutional path of 
countries (See also Aron, 2000 for a review of studies on 
the nexus between growth and institutions, Bates 1983, 
and Barro, 1991 on African exceptionalism in economic 
growth). 
Studies that investigated the economic implications of 
political instabilities largely overlooked the question of 
why political instabilities occur in the first place. A major 
departure from such paradigms was provided by Collier 
and Hoeffler (1998). In a study that dealt with the 
incidence of civil war in Africa, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) 
showed that, while Africa has had a similar incidence of 
civil wars to other developing regions, its vulnerability 
was explained more by economic conditions. In contrast 
to other regions, Africa showed a rising trend for civil 
wars as a consequence of its poor economic perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, social conditions were more 
conducive to reducing the likelihood of civil wars in Africa. 
In line with the work of Collier and Hoeffler, our interest in 
this paper is also to investigate the determinant factors of 
political instability. More specifically, we define political 
instability as a non-constitutional change in government 
in a given a country. We also limit our focus on 
differences in tenure of governments within Africa.   
 
 
Model 
 
Let T ≥ 0 denote the duration with a given distribution in 
the population and t a specific realisation of T. In this 
case, T represents duration in terms of years  in  which  a 
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given regime had survived before it was replaced by a 
coup état at period t. Accordingly, countries enter into 
the initial state anytime in the interval [0,40], that is, 
between 1960 and 2000. Countries in Africa entered the 
initial state at different times since their dates of 
independence also vary. Note that we take 1960 as the 
start period for few countries which gained independence 
before that date (Ghana, Guinea, South Africa and 
Sudan) as well as those which avoided colonisation 
altogether (Ethiopia and Liberia).    
Therefore, the probability that a regime survives 
beyond a specific time, say t, is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 −−−−>=−≡ tTPtFtS  
 
Where ( ) ( ) ( )2−−−≤= tTPtF  
0≥t  
 
is the cumulative distribution function (cdf). Assuming that 
duration is continuos with differentiable cdf, the 
probability of a regime failure in the interval [t, t+h] given 
that it survived up until time t is given by: 
 
( ) )3(/ −−−−−≥+<≤ tThtTtP  
 
The hazard function is, then, defined as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )4/lim
0
−−−−
≥+<≤
=
↓ h
tThtTtP
t
h
λ   
 
When the cdf is differentiable, we can take the limit of the 
right-hand side, divided by h, as h approaches zero from 
above: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )511
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−−−=
−
=
−
⋅
−+
=
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Because the derivative of ( )tS is ( )tf− , we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )6log −−−−−−−=
dt
tSd
tλ  
 
And using ( ) 00 =F , we can integrate to get 
( ) ( ) ( )70,exp1
0
−−−−−>





−−=  tdsstF
t
λ  
 
Which then gives the density of T as: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )8exp
0
−−−−−





−= 
t
dssttF λλ  
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Table 1. Classification of African regimes by survival rates. 
 
Duration in years Number of countries Percentage share in total 
5 6 13.3 
5< x 10 8 17.8 
10< x 20 11 24.4 
>20 20 44.4 
Total 45 99.9 
 
Source: Own calculation using ARP (2008). 
 
 
 
One important notion in hazard functions is duration 
dependence, i.e. if and how time spent in the initial state 
affects likelihood of exit. If the length of time a regime 
survives has no bearing on the probability of its removal 
from office then the process is called memory-less and 
can be represented by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )9exp1 −−−−−−−−−= ttF λ  
 
However, if the longer a regime stays in power the more 
likely it is to be dislodged from power then we have 
positive duration dependence. Such a situation is best 
captured by the Weibull distribution with the hazard 
function given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )10/ 1 −−−−−−−== −αγαλ ttStft  
 
When, on the other hand, long regime tenure improves 
chances of survival for a regime, or when there exists a 
negative duration dependence, such a scenario can be 
described by a log-logistic hazard function as given by: 
 
( ) ( )11
1
1
−−−−−−−−−−−
+
=
−
α
α
γ
γαλ
t
t
t  
 
Our concern here is in the analysis of single-spell data 
with time invariant covariates. Although forced regime 
changes occur at different points in time in a given 
country, sometimes multiple cases within a year, we 
consider in this study the survival time of a given regime 
between its first entry into the initial state (that is year of 
independence) and it got removed from power through 
non-constitutional means. As such, the values of the 
political and economic covariates refer to the time when 
the country enters the initial state.  
Thus, our model is specified as: 
 
Yi = i + iX + iZ + i-----------(12) 
 
Where Yi is duration in number of years in which a regime 
survived before being replaced; X is level of income; Z 
accounts for the political variables as discussed below; 
and i is the error term. 
Data and analysis 
 
The dependent variable in our model is the number of 
years a regime installed at independence stayed in power 
before being forcefully removed. It is recorded regardless 
of whether or not the change in executive originated from 
within ruling party political in-fighting. For countries which 
experienced no regime change, the relevant duration 
values were number of years from independence to 
2000. We draw this data from the online data base of the 
African Research Program at Harvard University (ARP, 
2008). One observes different patterns in terms of regime 
survival among African countries. In certain cases, newly 
installed and/or elected governments at the time the 
countries had come out of colonisation remained in office 
for a short period of time. For instance, the first govern-
ment of Benin lasted only for three years while the life-
span of that of Seychelles was only a year. In fact, eleven 
of the 46 African governments under consideration 
remained in power for six or less years before being 
removed forcefully. Governments in countries such as 
Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Niger and Nigeria 
registered survival duration of between ten and twenty 
years while at the other end there existed several 
governments in office for more than three decades. It is 
worth noting that long regime survival did not necessarily 
mean stable political environment as the experiences of 
Angola and Mozambique indicate. In both these 
countries, regimes lasted long despite continuous large 
scale civil wars. 
As shown in Table 1, the modal regime life in Africa, 
since independence in the early 1960s, is more than 
twenty years. The relatively long tenure of African 
regimes becomes all the more apparent when we 
consider the cumulative share of those regimes that 
survived between 10 - 20 years and above 20 years. In this 
case, about two in three African leaders stay in power for 
more than ten years. Regime longevity seems to have little 
correlation with regards to the fact that a regime is 
totalitarian or not. In so far as we speak of better 
governed states which avoided non-constitutional change 
in their executives (e.g. Botswana and Mauritius), we also 
find a number of autocratic regimes that have lasted for 
decades. Gabon and Togo provide cases in point to the 
latter set of countries. However, very  long  and  relatively  
  
 
  
Table 2. Determinants of regime survival in Africa. 
 
Variable One Two Three Four 
Income -1.19*** -1.16*** -0.99** -1.05*** 
Democracy 0.24* 0.13   
British -1.58**  -1.40*  
French  0.79  0.83 
Autocracy   -0.25* -0.18* 
Constant 0.85*** 0.71** 0.88** 0.76** 
Chi2 42.50 20.56 36.96 27.55 
N 46 46 46 46 
 
NB. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Estimation is by 
Weibull regression: log-relative hazard form. We also used 
robust standard errors. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
 
stable rule under an autocratic regime did not guarantee 
that such pattern of rule continues once a regime change 
occurs. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire plunged into severe 
political turmoil, including its first coup d e`tat in 1999, only 
after the 34 year rule of Houphouët-Boigny. 
We apply a string of political, economic as well as 
social factors that are widely considered to have a 
resonance on political economy trajectories of African 
countries. We use real GDP per capita to control for 
economic determinants of regime survival. Because of its 
comparative edge in terms of longer time coverage, the 
political explanatory variables are drawn from the Polity 
IV data (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). In broadest terms, 
the variables from Polity data account for three institu-
tional attributes; namely democratic governance, process 
of executive recruitment and the degree to which political 
competition was allowed in executive selection. A 
detailed definition of each political variable is provided in 
the discussion of results below. Recent research unders-
cored the relevance of colonial history in explaining 
current disparities in political economy outcomes of 
countries (Acemoglu et al., 2001). We control for this 
phenomenon by including a dummy for the identity of the 
colonial power in each country’s history. In particular, we 
investigate whether the different colonial models pursued 
by Britain and France shaped hazard of regime failure in 
different ways. 
A number of interesting patterns emerge when we 
apply a quantitative analysis of the determinants of 
regime survival in Africa. Firstly, colonial history matters 
strongly in defining whether regimes in Africa face higher 
or lower hazards of violent removal. More specifically, as 
compared to those countries under French and other 
countries’ colonial rule, former British colonies faced less 
hazard rates to encounter regime removal. At any given 
survival time, an African head of government of a former 
British colonial state is 40 - 58% less likely to be forcibly 
removed from power. Nevertheless, we find the effect of 
French colonial rule on the survival rates of African heads 
of states to be statistically insignificant. 
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Secondly, regardless of colonial history or any other 
political factor, state of the economy is also a very strong 
determinant of regime survival in Africa. As shown in 
model one above, a one percent difference in income 
levels between countries translates into a 19% difference 
in rates of survival of a regime in Africa. Models two, 
three, and four also indicate that, irrespective of which 
controls were introduced, level of income in a country, 
measured by real GDP per capita, reduces the likelihood 
of a regime’s removal between 16% and 0.99%. This 
finding underscores the point that the resonance of 
economic growth in Africa travels beyond enhancing 
material welfare of its population; since the political health 
of states in the region is also very much affected by the 
health of their economies. 
Thirdly, the type of regime in place also matters in 
determining the hazard rates of regime collapse in Africa. 
Results from model one show that better governed states 
(that is, on the Polity democratic score) are more likely to 
go through sudden and unconstitutional regime turnover 
than other states. This is in particular true of former 
British colonies; in which case a unit increase in the 
democratic score of a country entails a 24% higher 
hazard rate for its regime to be toppled at any given time. 
However, as shown in Table 2, we could not draw similar 
inferences for former French colonies in Africa. What is 
more emphatic is the fact that autocratic regimes, 
regardless of their colonial history, seem to enjoy longer 
regime tenure. A one unit increase in the autocracy score 
(that is, deterioration of governance) reduced the regime 
removal hazard rates for British and French colonies by 
25% and 18% respectively. Still, a caution is in order. 
Although it is true that autocratic regimes in Africa face 
less hazard rates of removal through coup d e`tat, political 
instabilities in these countries take different forms such 
as civil conflicts and border wars. 
We introduce a couple of additional political variables to 
identify determinants of regime survival in Africa. The 
variable XCONST refers to the extent of institutionalised 
constraints on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectives (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2007). The other variable (XROPEN), also 
from Polity data, assesses the degree to which the 
position of chief executive is open to all politically active 
population; and can be attained through regularised 
systems. As the results reported in Table 3 indicate, the 
clear demarcation in the behaviour of political regimes 
between former British and French, which we observed in 
the previous analysis, persists in this particular case as 
well. Accordingly, neither the levels of constraints 
imposed on chief executives nor the openness of the 
head of state position for political competition influences 
regime survival in former French colonies in Africa. 
Nevertheless, we observe a different scenario for those 
countries which used to be under British colonial rule. In this 
case, a more open political space seems to lower regime 
removal hazard rates while broader constrains on decision-
making powers of the chief executive reduces the  survival 
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Table 3. Determinants of regime survival in 
Africa (other political factors). 
 
Variable Five Six 
Income -1.04*** -0.93*** 
XCONST 0.36* 0.22 
XROPEN -0.64 -0.73 
British -1.29*  
French  0.62 
Constant 0.94** 0.84** 
Chi2 23.61 17.87 
N 46 46 
 
NB. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Estimation 
is by Weibull regression: log-relative hazard 
form. We also used robust standard errors. 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
 
 
rates of African regimes. This latter factor accounts for 
the fact that the military in Africa enjoys strong leverage 
on African governments. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Africa’s political history since independence has largely 
been marred by widespread political violence; and a 
concomitant pattern of lacklustre economic performance. 
Almost all parts of the region have undergone severe 
political upheavals which, in certain cases such as Liberia 
and Somalia, led to state failures. A characteristic feature 
of the African political landscape has been the 
vulnerability of governments to non-constitutional remo-
val. For instance, Benin had as many as four successful 
coup d e`tat in the first ten years of its independence. 
Amid all the uncertainties, however, African regimes tend 
to have a long tenure on average. In this study, we 
investigated the reasons behind the disparities in regime 
survival in Africa. We showed that part of Africa’s 
problems with regards to the strength of its governments 
emanates from colonial legacy. It is shown that govern-
ments in former British colonies face relatively lower 
hazard rates on this type of political upheaval. Economics 
also plays a powerful role in determining the likelihood for 
an African government to face removal at any point in 
time. The length of term of office for chief executives in 
Africa remains a thorny issue, even after the wave of 
political reforms of the past two decades. Uganda’s 
Museveni reneged on promises of mandatory two-term 
limit to hang on power. Chiluba of Zambia, Muluzi of 
Malawi, and Obasanjo of Nigeria were but few of the 
leaders who unsuccessfully tried to change term limits. 
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